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Abstract
Looking Beyond the Storms of major events and reactionary tendencies
to prevent future disasters—and continuing to fix things—the author
introduces a fresh assessment in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, the
vexing challenge of domestic shootings, and a persistent nationwide
drought. This paper offers a refreshing perspective on the need for
transformational and innovative thinking on preparedness, response, and
resilience, as well as disaster management. Against the backdrop of 9-11
terrorist attacks and natural disasters such as hurricanes Katrina, Irene,
and Sandy, this paper, highlights that we—as homeland security planners
and policymakers—must look beyond the immediate demands of grant
proposals and a narrow focus on “prevention” and “protection” to a
systemic analysis of “mitigation, response, and recovery”—based upon
required functions and capabilities. It asserts the need for change from
spending scarce dollars to prevent that which is inevitable and nervously
trying to protect physical locations—in an environment of growing
complexity and uncertainty—to a posture that integrates resilience as an
active virtue in all elements of the homeland security enterprise. There is
a sense of urgency that challenges leaders to understand the strategic
imperatives and unique opportunities in building all-hazards community
resilience.
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Introduction 
There is no safe harbor to avoid the impact of catastrophic events – “physical” disasters, such as 
extreme weather, earthquakes, and terrorism; or those that are “virtual” such as chemicals, 
infectious diseases, money, and electrons – and their direct or indirect consequences on the 
homeland. We face rapidly changing times, globally and nationally, marked by complexities and 
uncertainties that force us to make difficult decisions about homeland security and community 
preparedness.1 This article suggests a new approach that leverages whole-of-government and 
private-sector capabilities to systematically strengthen preparedness, response and resilience.   
 
The destabilizing impact of recent disasters has provoked a reactionary posture that is not 
necessarily in the long-term interests of preparedness. Beyond the unquantifiable human costs 
associated with hazards, figures from 2011 reveal that economic damages from natural disasters 
in the United States exceeded $55 billion.2 In 2012, there were many domestic disasters 
including Superstorm Sandy, lethal wildfires, regional droughts, domestic terrorism, and the 
spread of West Nile virus.3 While we must address immediate crises and apply the lessons 
learned from 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the Haiti earthquake, and Deepwater Horizon oil spill, this 
study looks Beyond the Storms of pressing events to identify strategic opportunities that would 
make the nation better prepared and more secure through a new focus on systemic preparedness, 
response, and resilience. 
 
This article documents the results of an exploratory study designed to examine the state of 
preparedness in the United States by drawing upon policy reviews, case studies, and expert 
interviews. The relevant body of literature and policies addressing preparedness and critical 
infrastructure protection is informed by academic, private sector, cross-governmental, and 
security imperatives with a focus on the post-9/11, post-Katrina threat environment of natural 
disasters, terrorism, cyber-attacks, and health pandemics. Against that backdrop, this article is 
focused on the following themes: 
 
• The current state of preparedness based on policy directives to prevent, protect 
from, mitigate, respond to, and recover from disasters; 
• Understanding the complexity and interdependencies of critical infrastructures 
and central role of global supply chains; 
• The assertion of resilience as a public good enabled by collective action, 
interagency coordination, and public-private partnerships (PPPs); 
• The ability of cross-governmental stakeholders to implement policy under the 
current whole-of-nation interagency constructs; and 
                                                             
1
 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010); Thad Allen, “The Future of Homeland 
Security: The Evolution of the Homeland Security Department’s Roles and Missions,” Testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, July 22, 2012, available at: 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/the-future-of-homeland-security-the-evolution-of-the-homeland-security-
departments-roles-and-missions. 
2
 Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters, Committee on Science, Engineering, and 
Public Policy. Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2012. 
Print. 
3
 One NGO estimates there were 1,274 anti-government groups at the end of 2011, up from 131 groups four years 
ago. 
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• Potential remedies to strengthen preparedness, response, and resilience in 
support of all-hazards safety, security, economic, and environmental objectives. 
 
More than Critical Infrastructure Protection 
The initial focus of this study was on critical infrastructure protection (CIP), but ultimately 
extended to the broader concepts of preparedness and resilience, as the research pointed toward a 
broader strategic view.  It is clear that disaster management planners, and leaders across public-
private sectors, understand how to build and protect infrastructures within their areas of 
responsibility, but often lack awareness of the challenges facing adjacent geographic or 
infrastructure sectors.  Therefore, there is a significant lack of resilience thinking, integrated 
planning, and collective action at the national, regional, state, and local level. 
 
Empirical data revealed a fragmented planning and risk assessment process where agencies tend 
to focus narrowly on their areas of concern (ports, bridges, railways, tunnels, 
telecommunications, power, water, etc.), yet fail to recognize the complex interdependencies of 
the broader homeland security enterprise. Furthermore, when preparing budget requests or 
proposals for grant funding, submissions reflected this isolated approach that safeguarded their 
specific region or municipality at the expense of the collective good. Initial findings uncovered 
that while we live in an interconnected world of complex 21st century vulnerabilities, we often 
employ 20th century ways of thinking and planning for security – allocating resources for 
physical protection based on the most senior member on the congressional committee, best-
written grant proposal, or a bias for “fixing things” to relieve the most immediate pain. 
 
Current State of Preparedness 
In the past century, catastrophic disasters have brought dramatic reminders that we need to better 
understand risk mitigation and how to improve critical infrastructure resilience. It recognizes that 
some 85 percent of all critical infrastructures, across sixteen independent sectors, are owned and 
operated locally or regionally by the private sector and often influenced by an uncoordinated 
mixture of investors, volunteers, non-profit organizations, labor unions, and utilities; and the 
federal government is often hard-pressed – or simply unable – to institute changes.4 
 
It is increasingly clear that the nation needs a new resilience-based approach to critical 
infrastructure protection that can be integrated into the homeland security enterprise and builds 
greater trust across public and private stakeholders. Action plans are needed – not just 
government strategy documents – to implement preparedness policies and incentivize the private 
sector to support policymaking, equity investments, cost recovery, new insurance markets, and 
legislative changes, or the nation’s infrastructure will remain in the current state of disrepair.5  
Researchers and global innovators emphasize the futility of popular security habits (with a 
                                                             
4
 “Critical infrastructures" are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the nation that their 
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, economic security, public health or 
safety, or any combination of those areas (USA Patriot Act of 2001, Section 1016e); Flynn, Stephen, The Edge of 
Disaster – Rebuilding a Resilient Nation (New York: Random House, 2007); National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council (NIAC), Cross Sector Interdependencies and Risk Assessment Guidance, January 13, 2004, available at: 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/irawgreport.pdf. 
5
 Thad Allen, “The Future of Homeland Security.” 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.2.3
34 
 
fixation on physical protection), and assert the need for new, more pragmatic resilient 
approaches because “the holy war against the boogeymen hasn’t worked and isn’t likely to 
anytime soon.” 6  
 
There is a clarion call for a shift in disaster preparedness that places a sharp focus on resiliency. 
The statistics predict a looming challenge that is not well understood by a population that expects 
critical infrastructures to automatically serve their needs.  For example, approximately 75 percent 
of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) is fueled by metro communities while over 80 
percent of the U.S. population is located in eleven mega-regions, where new approaches to 
resilience-thinking are needed most. The risk assessments and analytical frameworks which 
model the infrastructure resilience in an interconnected environment must be developed to better 
understand these complex urban communities, as underscored by the cascading regional impacts 
caused by disasters such as the October 2012 Superstorm Sandy. Now that federal funds are 
receding, there is a need for increased private sector participation and regional approaches to 
address the “wicked problems” being faced by preparedness planners.  The 90,000 local, 
regional, and state flood maps maintained by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) are incomplete or outdated as extreme weather conditions have revealed in recent years; 
and corresponding products – risk maps – for the regional all-hazards threat environment do not 
exist.7 
 
A Nation at Risk 
The United States is at a critical juncture where many infrastructures are aging or failing, and 
current efforts to address the challenge are insufficient. America invests barely 2 percent of its 
GDP in infrastructure renewal and maintenance, one of the lowest figures among the world’s 
industrialized nations. The following facts expose some of our demographic and infrastructure 
fault lines: 
• Using input from engineers in every state, the American Society of Civil 
Engineers (ASCE) gave the national infrastructure an overall grade of D-plus, a 
score impacted by failing areas such as aviation, drinking-water-supply, roads, 
transit, and sewage treatment; 
• 42 percent of the nation’s urban highways are congested, which costs our 
economy more than $101 billion annually in lost time and fuel, while increasing 
harmful exhaust and pollution; 
• 38 percent of the roads are in disrepair and the U.S. must invest $225 billion per 
year over the next fifty years to maintain and enhance a decaying surface 
                                                             
6
 Zolli, Andrew and Ann Marie Healy, Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back (New York: Free Press, 2012). 
7
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Challenges in FEMA’s 
Flood Map Modernization Program. Report No. OIG-05-44 (September 2005); U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes 
Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience. Report No. GAO-10-296 (March 2010); Morton, John and 
Catherine Feinman, DomPrep Action Plan: Building Resilient Regions for a Secure and Resilient Nation (Severna 
Park: IMR Group, Inc., 2012); National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), Regional Resilience Scoping 
Study, March 23, 2012, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac-regional-resilience-white-paper-
032412.pdf. 
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transportation system; we are currently spending less than 40 percent of this 
amount; 
• The U.S. operates 361 major ports and delivers $13 billion containers globally per 
year, supporting the world’s largest trading commerce ($645 billion), yet there is 
no executive agent assigned to manage or integrate this dynamic global supply 
chain and associated policies; 
• The Army Corps of Engineers estimates that over 95 percent of overseas trade 
produced or consumed by the U.S. moves through our nation’s commercial ports. 
Yet, our ports are in danger of losing their competitive advantage due to the slow 
and very complex process of critical dredging projects; 
• By 2020, every major U.S. container port is projected to be handling at least 
double the volume it was designed to handle, and by 2040, this figure is projected 
to triple; 
• Over the next twenty years across the nation, railroads are projected to need 
nearly $200 billion in investments to accommodate increased freight traffic; 
• Over 25 percent of the nation’s bridges are considered structurally deficient;  
• There are approximately 85,000 dams in the country, averaging over fifty years 
old, and 4,000 are considered structurally at risk; and 
• There are 500 major urban public transit operators, 66,000 chemical plants, over 
2,800 electric plants, 104 nuclear power plants, 1,600 municipal waste water 
facilities, over two million miles of pipelines, 87,000 food processing plants, and 
5,000 public airports owned and operated independently; however, they are highly 
interdependent in their functional capabilities.8 
 
The Issue of Our Day 
This sampling of facts bespeaks a menacing challenge that must be addressed with a sense of 
urgency or infrastructure systems will continue to erode along with public safety and security. 
Many believe that this challenge – to dramatically transform how we secure and maintain our 
critical infrastructure through a posture of resilience – is the “issue of our day.” As the “Greatest 
Generation” confronted the threats from Germany and Japan in World War II, and proceeded to 
build the domestic infrastructure system that has been enjoyed for the past sixty years, the 
current generation also faces defining challenges. There is a need for a comparable resolve in 
facing today’s serious challenges – including economic austerity, natural disasters, and global 
                                                             
8
 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Key Sectors,” 
Testimony before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives. Report No. GAO-07-626T (March 2007); Gerencser, Mark, Van Lee Reginald, Fernando 
Napolitano and Christopher Kelly, Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business, and Non-Profits Can 
Tackle Today’s Global Challenges Together (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Byram, Daniel (Ed), 
Introduction to Homeland Security (New York: Pearson Custom Publishing, 2009), 164-65; Thad Allen, “The 
Future of Homeland Security.”; A New Economic Analysis of Infrastructure Investment: A Report Prepared by the 
Department of Treasury with the Council of Economic Advisors (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Treasury, 
March 23, 2012); Haya El Nasser, “American Cities to Millennials: Don’t Leave,” USA Today, December 4, 2012, 
available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/03/american-cities-to-millennials-dont-leave-
us/1744357/.; American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure 
(Reston: ASCE Publications, 2013). 
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security threats – to forge a culture of preparedness and invest wisely in critical infrastructure 
resilience. 
 
Globalization and expanded markets have unwittingly introduced the potential for greater 
cascading hazards. Many of the freedoms that accompany technology and social networking 
advancements have in fact made us more vulnerable. This study reinforces observations made 
since the Y2K scare thirteen years ago, when spending by the U.S. government and commercial 
industry to predict and prevent adverse impacts on critical infrastructures exceeded $100 billion. 
During this time period, the lessons of globalization and cyber security suggest that 
vulnerabilities from “system complexity” have expanded at a faster pace than our means of 
mitigating them. Further, interconnected infrastructure systems, while offering greater speed and 
efficiency, now present larger targets for potential exploitation by criminals and terrorists 
because these networked architectures are operated in an open society.9  The qualities of speed, 
access, and anonymity that make these robust systems so effective are the same features that 
make them more vulnerable to nefarious elements. 
 
Threats to our physical and virtual security are complex, new, and growing. They demand a new 
approach to how we prepare for attacks and sustain our infrastructure, as well as how we 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from crises. Many of the threats we face cannot be deterred or 
countered simply because the provision of civil liberties and a free society are paramount. The 
idea that complete physical security is normal, or even achievable with enough Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) agents and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, is an 
illusion that is consuming our finite economic resources.10 Our focus must be fixed on building a 
new vision of 21st century resilience in the face of uncertain and complex risks.11 
 
Hope and Hubris 
This new vision starts with a careful examination of cultural mindsets and deeply held attitudes 
toward emergency hazards.  All disasters are personal, and the first priority in preparedness 
planning is an individual responsibility. According to FEMA guidelines, people should be self-
sufficient for seventy-two hours after a disaster strikes if evacuating, and longer if sheltering-in-
place.12 That is where the breakdown often begins. Experts emphasize that America will never 
truly mitigate the harsh impact of disasters until the public takes personal ownership for the 
preparations necessary to respond to and recover from emergencies.13 
 
                                                             
9
 Mussington, David, Concepts for Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Protection: Relating Y2K to CIP Research and 
Development (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002). 
10
 The 9/11 hijackers spent less than $1 million to attack the United States; while the cost to try to prevent similar 
future attacks (in police, airport security, and monitoring systems) costs Americans a million dollars an hour. 
11
 Flynn, Stephen and Burke, Sean, Critical Transportation Infrastructure and Societal Resilience (Washington, DC: 
Center for National Policy, 2012). 
12
 Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety (IIBHS). Know Your Plan – Prepare for a Disaster, 2012, 
available at: http://disastersafety.org/earthquake/disaster-planning-there%e2%80%99s-an-app-for-that/. 
13
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Response Framework, 2008, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRF.pdf.; U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, 
Themes, and Pathways for Action (Washington, D.C.: FDOC-104-008-1, 2011). 
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The challenge of raising public awareness about preparation before a disaster strikes is 
manifested in an attitude: “It will not happen to me,” or “We will just deal with it at the time.” 
While clearly a dangerous reaction, as learned from hurricanes Katrina, Irene, and Sandy, it can 
also be linked to difficult economic times. A society struggling with poverty and unemployment 
is focused on financial survival and is therefore, less likely to spend essential money (or even 
discretionary funds) on insurance or redundant systems that don’t have an immediate return on 
investment (ROI) or help “to pay the bills.” Yet, research indicates there is a 4:1 ratio associated 
with preventive action supporting infrastructure; for every dollar spent now on resilience-
building and disaster preparedness, one can avoid at least four-dollars in future losses. However, 
an investment in resilience is often considered an “invisible” payoff, because if built and 
maintained properly, infrastructure works as planned and life continues uninterrupted.14 
 
In addition to an attitude of denial, many people simply refuse to take ownership for individual 
preparation because “It is the government’s responsibility, and FEMA will take care of us.” This 
attitude must be challenged through a combination of initiatives at the local, regional, state, and 
national levels.15 Because extreme weather, terrorist attacks, and health epidemics are inevitable, 
citizens should rely less upon outside assistance and depend more upon their personal resources, 
enabling communities to be better prepared for future disasters.  Additionally, rather than 
creating a new “program” that would add another financial burden to already-struggling families 
and small-business communities, there should be incentives that can be applied to existing 
(family and small business) financial budgets to “reward” action taken to support resilience. 
Although federal funds are needed to implement some programs, many requirements can – and 
should – be accomplished through state-level programs.16 
 
Moving beyond human factors to an all-domain context (land, maritime, air, space, and cyber), 
the next section will introduce a framework that draws upon the current pillars of national 
preparedness (prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover), offering a continuum of options 
from infrastructure protection to functional continuity under a broad umbrella of resilience 
(Figure 1). This framework suggests a view of resilience that helps define the planning variables 
involved in national preparedness. There is an important distinction between “protection” – 
which focuses on the threats, and “continuity” – which focuses on resuming operations despite 
the consequences. In this framework, both objectives are enabled through the operating 
principles of resilience. And while prevention and protection may be the preferred options in 
                                                             
14
 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guiding Principles for the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure (Reston: 
ASCE Publications, 2009); Kerry, John, Frank Lautenberg and Kirsten Gillibrand, “Strengthening the Resiliency of 
Our Nation on the Ground (STRONG) Act (S-3691),” Library of Congress, available at: 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/3691. 
15
 Kettl, Donald, System under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2004); U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2010; American Red 
Cross, Web Users Increasingly Rely on Social Media to Seek Help in a Disaster, August 9, 2010, available at: 
http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.94aae335470e233f6cf911df43181aa0/?vgnextoid=6bb5a96d0a94
a210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD; U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Response 
Framework, 2008, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRF.pdf; Morton and Feinman, DomPrep Action 
Plan, 2012. 
16
 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2010. 
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levels of complexity: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity. These traditional 
measures signal the need for innovative thinking that goes beyond simply investing in more 
“guns, gates, guards, and locks” in order to protect physical structures. We must identify the 
capabilities needed to mitigate the impact of, and respond to, inevitable hazards. Oftentimes, it is 
nearly impossible to determine the risk of hazards because there is too much uncertainty to 
quantify the threats, vulnerabilities, or consequences. The variables in the equation can be so 
complex that this information is sometimes unknowable.20 
 
Therefore, the best return on investment – and source of confidence – across interdependent 
supply chains, infrastructure sectors, and interconnected systems is not a fortress-protection 
mentality, but an investment in “functional resilience” that imbues communities with a level of 
confident anticipation and personal preparation for inevitable disasters looming over the horizon. 
In a post-9/11, post-Sandy, post-H1N1 environment, we should no longer be surprised by 
disastrous interruptions to our otherwise normal lives, but should anticipate, and even expect, 
them.  We should prepare with a resilient mindset even if it does not come naturally. 
 
The Way Ahead—Functional Resilience 
Functional resilience is a broad term used in building codes, environmental design, and civil 
engineering that involves making systems more durable and disaster-resistant through agile and 
adaptive approaches. Beyond extending the effective life of systems, functional resilience allows 
them to operate more efficiently, demanding fewer resources for repair and emergency response 
because flexibility is incorporated into the initial design.21 The comprehensive application of this 
concept to preparedness and critical infrastructure resilience, along with the necessary 
assessment tools, has yet to be realized. There is encouraging work underway that includes 
computational models, operations research, and human factors, but there is a need to 
operationalize functional resilience in a coordinated and systematic manner. 
 
The principles of functional resilience complement existing public policies. The fundamental 
objective of national preparedness is to take a holistic approach, focusing on systemic 
investments that enable the enterprise to absorb the impact of a disaster event without losing the 
capacity to function. The supporting taxonomy, focused on large-scale optimization, must 
identify the functional capabilities of the national infrastructure system that are most important 
by geographic area, and help decide where to invest limited fiscal resources.22 
 
Building on this concept of functional resilience, how would one build a framework that is useful 
across local, state, and federal equities within the homeland? First, it must operate in parallel with 
traditional physical protection, because there will always be mission-essential locations that need to 
                                                             
20
 Bruneau, Michel, et al, “A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic Resilience of 
Communications,” Earthquakes Spectra 19:4 (2003): 733-752; Cooper-Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable, 2009.; 
Zolli and Healy, Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back, 2012). 
21
 Gunderson, L.H., C.S. Holling and S.S. Light, Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
22
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2007); U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, 2010.; Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) – Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2013). 
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be hardened against and protected from disaster. Second, it requires a capabilities-based approach 
with standard assessment criteria to determine where functions are assessed and located on the 
continuum of preparedness (between protection and continuity). Which functions are essential such 
that there is no tolerance for degradation; which ones can withstand disruption and some period of 
recovery; and which fall somewhere in-between with a mixture of functional capabilities?23 The 
criteria needed to make these judgments is developed by mapping the unique interdependencies of 
each geographic region, identifying the appropriate independent variables, and leveraging the tools 
of both qualitative and quantitative research.  
 
The goal is to better understand the nature of risk based upon essential functional requirements 
rather than on uncertain physical threats. Therefore, working with researchers, owners/operators, 
and policymakers, we need to introduce an effective framework (Figure 1) that is adaptable and 
scalable to various geographic and infrastructure areas.  Rather than a policy document that tries to 
fit all scenarios (which will be ignored by planners if not clearly relevant), guidance should take 
the form of a general framework that is scalable, recognizing that credible threat information is 
often unavailable.  By introducing a framework or model that can be applied across the range of 
functions and capabilities as general guidance, state and local authorities can better implement 
critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) and disaster management requirements. The utility 
of this resource will be demonstrated by how well future decisions are made regarding 
maintenance and repair priorities, and strategic funding, in order to strengthen preparedness and 
sustain critical infrastructure resilience.24 
 
This framework will offer the ability to align local, state, regional, and federal resiliency 
priorities in an integrated fashion that supports the greater good rather than the individual pet-
projects of political officials. For example, the Port of Los Angeles (POLA) moves more 
containers than any other maritime port in the country, providing intermodal access to 14 major 
freight hubs across the nation, and invests approximately $1 million per day in capital 
improvements. And how should the POLA and local ports (with eighty-eight different 
municipalities) best invest their scarce resources at such a critical transportation hub in the 
country? The question should be answered against a measurable set of capabilities-based criteria 
designed to achieve functional resilience in the face of certain and uncertain risks. 
 
Many Creative Ideas and Partners Available 
The encouraging news is that the United States is not alone. There are international partners who 
face similar challenges and are willing to share information, and professional fora to draw upon 
academia, public-private partnerships, and the experience of commercial industry to improve 
preparedness. We can no longer afford—financially, technologically, or environmentally—to 
take a unilateral approach toward preparedness when facing a globalized system of 
interdependent supply chains and infrastructure sectors.25 
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This study provides a new taxonomy that will help the nation and leaders committed to 
supporting resilience initiatives, understand how to: (1) make the case more clearly to 
policymakers and senior decision-makers, (2) leverage the capabilities of international partners, 
(3) incentivize investments from private equity sources, (4) start mapping functional 
interdependencies, and (5) build a capabilities-based model to advance the concept of resilience. 
Below are some exemplars that may help inform the efforts of preparedness planners in the 
public and private sectors: 
 
• Military and interagency studies on unrestricted, irregular, and unconventional 
conflict provide a relevant body of literature and critical thinking because of the 
similarities to complex and asymmetric factors that are present within critical 
infrastructure resilience and all-hazards environments; 
• Academic institutions and Homeland Security Centers of Excellence across the 
country are actively studying and testing many of the issues surrounding 
preparedness and critical infrastructure resilience, generating research-based 
models to help inform strategic and operational planning; 
• After the attacks of 9/11, aviation transportation was grounded for three full days 
as a security precaution; and the maritime ports, with the exception of the Ports of 
Los Angeles and Long Beach (POLALB), California, were closed, disrupting 
vital commerce and trade. Actions by the POLALB provide an example for 
centers of intermodal activity and complex interdependencies during future 
incidents, where advanced planning communications among emergency 
management, law enforcement, port authority, regulators, labor unions, and 
congressional leaders allowed increased security and sustained port operations to 
occur simultaneously; 
• Counterparts to Homeland Security and FEMA planners in the British Cabinet 
Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat have successfully implemented “business 
continuity” strategies with the private sector by leveraging the relationships that 
small and medium-size enterprises already trust and rely upon: suppliers, 
customers, banks, insurance companies, professional organizations, and 
distributors; 
• United Kingdom (UK) officials conduct an annual National Risk Assessment 
(since 2005), and publish an unclassified National Risk Register of Civil 
Emergencies to explain—in terms that are clear to the general public—what an 
emergency is and the types of risks (natural hazards and terrorist threats) that 
government planners are prepared for; and they offer on-line resources to 
summarize how members of the public should prepare; 
• The Australian National Security Strategy reflects a Beyond the Storms approach, 
placing “ensure a safe and resilient population,” and, “secure our assets, 
infrastructure, and institutions” as two of their four strategic national security 
objectives. One of the eight pillars to support these objectives is “strengthening 
resilience” across their society. Recognizing “it is not possible to eliminate all 
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risks to national security,” they place a focus on public-private partnerships and 
building community cohesion in order to “respond and recover quickly” to restore 
essential services.26 
 
The Implementation Challenge—Public Private Partnerships 
The key to implementation of any local, state, regional, or national level policies in support of 
critical infrastructure resilience, preparedness, or business continuity is leveraging the utility of 
public-private partnerships.  While many of the strategies and policies that inform these public 
policy challenges originate from federal or state-level intergovernmental agencies most disaster 
management and emergency response activity occurs at the local level among private sector 
owners and operators.  And since some 85 percent of critical infrastructures are managed by the 
private sector, the greatest advancements in community resilience will stem from the actions of 
private-sector stakeholders. 
 
Strategic policies and national strategies assert the importance of expanding public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) and acknowledge the need to incentivize venture capitalists in supporting 
infrastructure improvements and disaster preparedness, but few details have emerged in 
academia, think-tanks, or public policies identifying how to incentivize these communities, 
infuse private sector investments, or significantly expand PPPs. Private industry is in the 
business of making money by seeking investments that will reduce risk, demand less manpower, 
and provide a reliable flow of revenue in the current fiscal climate. As the public sector seeks to 
remove barriers and incentivize the private sector to increase participation in joint ventures and 
partnerships, there will be a natural resistance to form PPPs within commercial industry because 
anything that could provide competitors with a market advantage is not something they will be 
interested in.   
 
To help put this issue in context for both government planners and commercial industry, consider 
the economic impact of a port strike and the amount of revenue the private sector might lose. 
Estimates can vary widely, but experts claim that an eleven-day lockout at ports on the West 
Coast in 2002 cost the economy approximately $1 billion per day.  More recently, in December 
2012, this situation reared its head in the POLALB, where a strike by union clerical workers 
resulted in the closing of ten terminals at the nation’s busiest port complex, costing the local 
economy billions of dollars over a two-week period—and forcing some ships to sail to other 
west coast ports to offload their cargo.27 Not only will dockworkers refuse to cross picket lines 
established by union workers who are striking for a new contract, but private companies will not 
share information that would in any way weaken their market position with other ports.  When 
preparedness or resiliency policy is developed, policymakers must look at both the national 
interests as well as local economic realities that drive industry decisions.  For example, rerouting 
of shipping-container traffic from POLALB to another west coast port-of-entry may support 
                                                             
26
 Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Strong and Secure—A Strategy for 
Australia’s National Security,” Australian National Security Strategy, January 23, 2013, available at: 
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/. 
27
 Brad Plumer, “Could a Port Strike Really Cripple the U.S. Economy?” The Washington Post, December 27, 2012, 
available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/27/could-a-port-strike-really-cripple-the-
u-s-economy/. 
Egli: Beyond the Storms: Strengthening Preparedness, Response, & Resili
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
43 
 
national policy objectives and preparedness calculations, but it’s not likely to be a model that the 
ports will support.28 
 
Figure 2: Port of Los Angeles 29 
 
 
National Call to Action 
The major findings from this study underscore areas that must be addressed by the nation – at the 
local, regional, state, and federal level – if we are to establish a culture of community resilience 
within our society: 
• The analysis of critical infrastructure protection and key resources point to 
broader strategic imperatives of preparedness, response, and functional resilience; 
• Awareness of America’s economic dependence upon outdated critical 
infrastructure and fragile global supply chains is lacking across the general public; 
• The intersection of interagency coordination and collective action offers a 
systematic approach and practical utility to advance national preparedness; 
• There is a need for a functional resilience framework to implement existing 
policies, strengthen regional resilience, and imbue a culture of preparedness; 
• Because of extensive interdependencies across all infrastructure sectors, there are 
potential cascading impacts that can occur where local incidents trigger national-
level degradation in services; and 
• Further study is needed to examine regional dependencies and interdependencies, 
operationalize public-private partnerships, and craft a whole-of-nation campaign 
for action. 
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Drawing from these strategic findings, a team of researchers, analysts, and planners are taking 
steps to address some of the major challenges outlined in this article.  These efforts will serve as 
a catalyst among public and private-sector leaders to nationally expand awareness of 
preparedness and operationalize critical infrastructure resilience: 
(1) Systematic risk-mapping of infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies in 
specific geographic areas to understand what the essential ligaments of preparedness 
and resilience are for complex intermodal systems. By employing scenario-based 
analyses, one can understand the potential impact of a disaster and conduct a nodal 
analysis to understand connectedness between and among critical infrastructures. 
The outcome of this effort will be a “risk map” that identifies intermodal variables, 
single-points-of-failure, and supporting interdependencies; 
 
(2) Developing a functional resilience framework, using an integrated approach which 
helps planners identify how to proceed, and prioritize capability gaps in preparedness 
and resilience.  Drawing from both qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria, 
as well as the outputs of the risk mapping effort, business rules and mitigating 
actions will be identified that allow emergency planners to focus on the most 
important functional areas. The outcome of this effort will be a conceptual 
methodology that can be generalized or adapted to other communities in scalable and 
flexible manner. The graphic representation of the framework will serve as a point of 
clarity to planners and practitioners who must begin to understand this approach as it 
applies to critical infrastructure resilience.  It will also serve as key input to 
subsequent planning to implement unique actionable items for that geographic 
location; and  
 
(3) Formulating a strategic action plan to operationalize the outcomes from the first two 
phases, providing planners with leading indicators where and when events must be 
executed. During this phase policymakers must forge a consensus among private- 
and public-sector leaders regarding discrete projects, priorities, and implementation 
efforts.  The outcome of this phase will be a roadmap that synchronizes the efforts 
necessary to achieve increased resilience, and may require new developments in 
governance, concepts of operations, and technology. 
 
Conclusion 
This article highlights the need for action in promoting resilience at local, state, regional, and 
national levels, which can be accomplished through awareness, planning, resource allocation and 
strong leadership.30  In order to operationalize these themes, this study asserts the importance of 
collective action in addressing national-level preparedness through expanded interagency 
coordination and increased private sector participation. Building upon functional continuity, 
preparedness, and disaster management principles (Figure 1), there is a need to better understand 
resilience as an organizing principle to address national preparedness and CIKR imperatives. It is 
clear further research is needed to generate new data and models for understanding highly 
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complex and uncertain environments. A systematic mapping of local, regional, state, and 
national capabilities-based requirements, based on a “functional” decomposition of all 
infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies is needed. As this study highlights, such 
research should be a high federal priority and be pursued aggressively with an all-hazards, 
intergovernmental, holistic approach to advance national preparedness and resilience objectives. 
 
The findings of this study align with other major policies and initiatives, including Presidential 
Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), the report, “Improved 
Disaster Resilience is Imperative to U.S.”, and the STRONG Act legislation.31 Both have 
emerged since August 2012, and represent a unique opportunity to build a “resiliency consensus” 
among public and private-sector planners. While these documents contain many strong 
recommendations, they will not make a difference when the next disaster impacts critical 
infrastructure systems unless leaders agree to collectively join with cross-government 
interagency, private sector, and academic actors to form a coalition of like-minded innovators.  
Disaster management planners must be willing to move Beyond the Storms of the immediate 
budget crisis and pressure to react to the most recent disaster, and team with others to resource, 
implement, operationalize, and measure this homeland security imperative.  However, it will 
require extraordinary resolve and leadership to forge a consensus among a disparate group of 
local, regional, state, and national leaders to bridge the current divide between individual rhetoric 
and collective action. 
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